
Defense Procurement Corruption — Lessons from the U.S. Experience

Professor Christopher Yukins The George Washington University Law School

Presentation to Transparency International – 12th International Anti-Corruption Conference (IACC)

Guatemala City, Guatemala November 16, 2006




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Understanding the U.S. Procurement System




V.



LAW SCHOOL


Defense Spending Dominates U.S. Procurement




Goals, Principles, Constraints?

- Transparency
- Integrity (Corruption Control)
- Competition
- Uniformity
- **Risk Avoidance**
- Wealth Distribution
- Best value
- Efficiency (administrative)
- Customer Satisfaction


Competing
Policies and
Aspirations




Historical Progression




Sealed Bids Negotiated Procurements "Frameworks" Contracting



Impact of Shift to "Frameworks" Contracting





Bad Actors

Some Obvious Problems



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Darleen Druyun

- Previously highestranking civilian official in Air Force procurement systems
- Convicted of improper job negotiations with Boeing
- Admitted favoring Boeing in hundreds of millions of dollars in procurement
- Sentenced to prison
- \$650M Boeing settlement



"They [Airbus] came in a couple of weeks ago and offered to build the majority [of the tankers] here in America.... I am not sure where this will lead, but the benefits of competition may be revealing...."

Michael Wynne on the Boeing tanker-lease deal





"Mike, you must be out of your mind!!!"

AF Secretary JAMES ROCHE

More

Obvious

Duke

Problems



Ex-Aide To Bush Found Guilty
Safavian Lied in Abramoff Scandal
By <u>Jeffrey H. Birnbaum</u>
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, June 21, 2006; Page A01


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Combating Corruption


- Human capital to bolster procurement system from within
 - Proper staffing
 - Qualification, Recruiting, Training, Retention, Incentives
- A Culture of Anti-Corruption
 - At leadership levels: costs of corruption
 - Creates large, albeit unstable, coalitions aligned against governing party
 - At field level: how to instill ethics in those in public service public and private?

Acquisition Workforce & Procurement Spending Defense

(reflective of government-wide experience)




- Acquisition Workforce (In hundreds of thousands, Packard Commission Methodology)
- → DoD Procurement Spending (in billions of dollars)



Other Causes for Concern: Outsourcing of Procurement Positions



Which code of ethics – government or contractor's?




How Guidelines and DFARS Compare

Sentencing Guidelines	DFARS 203.7001	
1. Standards and procedures	Code of Ethics	
2. Knowledgeable leadership		
3. Exclude risky personnel		
4. Training	Training	
5. Monitor, evaluate, reporting	Periodic review; audits;	
hotline	hotline	
6. Incentives and discipline	Discipline	
Adjust program to risk		
Self-reporting = sentencing factor	Timely reporting to government	
Cooperation = sentencing factor	Full cooperation with government GEOI	




United Nations Initiatives



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UN Convention Against Corruption (Art. 9)	UNCITRAL Model Procurement Law
Public Information	Yes
Advance award criteria and publication	Yes
Objective and predetermined criteria for award	Yes
Bid protest and appeal	Maybe
Measures to control procurement personnel – e.g., rules and codes	No
Transparency, including in budgeting and accounting	Yes



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Conclusion

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